WHOSE RIGHTS MATTER MOST?
FATHERS' RIGHTS, JOINT CUSTODY, AND

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

ELLIE J. SPIELBERGER

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the fathers' rights movement has gained
increasing power and influence in the formation and judicial
interpretation of custody and child support legislation. Despite
statistics to the contrary, many fathers claim they were the victims of
discrimination when they sought custody of their children. The fact
remains that women continue to be the primary nurturers and
caretakers of children; but, fathers' rights groups are working
forcefully to change this pattern. The focus of these well-organized,
often intensely zealous groups is a return to the traditional patriarchal
family structure, popularized by the vacuous phrase "family values,"
in which the father is the head of the household and the family unit is
insulated from any care the state would offer it.
This Comment addresses the relationship between the efforts of
the fathers' rights movement to establish a joint custody presumption
and legislation designed to protect victims of domestic violence. The
push for a standard that, in effect, destroys substantial progress made
to protect parents and children from domestic violence speaks volumes
about the gendered assumptions that are still very much in place where
child custody law is concerned. Although technically there has been
a shift from gendered custody standards to the gender-neutral "best
interest of the child" standard, when domestic violence is an issue in
custody determinations, the law still operates to discriminate against
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women and, in particular, against victims of domestic violence.
Fathers' rights groups, though, are concerned with obtaining what they
perceive as their rightful claim to their property (i.e., custody of their
children) to the exclusion of all other societal issues plaguing women
and families.
Part I of this Comment outlines the realities of domestic violence
as a backdrop to the custody issues that follow. Part II discusses joint
custody as it has emerged historically and politically as a controversial
variation of the "best interest of the child" standard. Part III addresses
the interplay between domestic violence and joint custody, and argues
that the joint custody presumption is detrimental to battered women
trying to raise their children in an atmosphere free of violence. Part
IV concerns the fathers' rights movement, its forceful push for the
joint custody presumption, and how several leaders of the movement
respond to the issue of domestic violence as it relates to custody.
Finally, this Comment concludes that domestic violence must be taken
into greater consideration in custody determinations, and that the
fathers' rights movement cannot be permitted to make light of the
domestic violence issue because it injures not only the women victims
but also the children.
I. THE REALITIES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Domestic violence is an epidemic that strikes approximately four
million American women each year.' Women are battered in at least
twenty-eight percent of all marriages; every year, one of eight
husbands physically abuses his wife.' The staggering statistics of
abuse within marriage are an important focus of this Comment, in part
because they affect custody decisions that are made in the context of
1. Although there are male victims of domestic violence, the use of the term
"victims" in this Comment refer to women victims, reflecting the fact that the
overwhelming number of spouses who are battered are women.
2.
Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protectionfor
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. RIv.
801, 807-08 (1993).
3.
Id. at 809. The authors point out that, for reasons such as a woman's lack
of financial and emotional resources and proficiency in English, these numbers are
drastically underreported.
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divorce,4 and in part because they refute the fathers' rights
movement's assertion that domestic violence is a disease that primarily
plagues the unmarried. 5
Domestic violence can assume many forms, including threats,
harassment, stalking, and, most obviously, physical abuse. The
violence most often occurs in a cycle, 6 beginning with "minor"
incidents and arguments and culminating in protracted physical abuse.
This is frequently followed by a period of repentance by the batterer,
referred to by practitioners as the "hearts and flowers stage." Many
victims are psychologically trapped in the cycle because the
perpetrator apologizes and promises to change, and the victim is led
to believe each time that that incident of violence will be the last one.
Traditionally, after several repetitions of this cycle, the woman
begins to believe that she is helpless, that she cannot control the
batterer, and, worse, that she cannot escape the violence. These dire
consequences of the abuse cycle, above all else, help to explain why
so many women stay in abusive relationships and are reluctant to seek
help. Further, many battered women feel pigeonholed by what they
perceive as their societal roles: if they leave, they are being
unsupportive wives and are breaking up their families, and thus are
also being neglectful mothers. Additionally, many women are
economically dependent on their husbands and fear that they will not
be able to provide for their children if they leave the marriage."
The obstacles battered women face have been underaddressed by
4.

The issue of putative fathers' rights isa separate and equally complex one.

See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Compare In the Interest of
J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994).
5.
See generally DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATERLESS AMERICA:
CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995). The author, President
of the National Fatherhood Initiative, writes that "married fatherhood serves as an
institutional inhibitor of domestic violence against women.n Id. at 245 n.33.
Blankenhorn cites no source for this assertion. The aforementioned statistics of
marital violence illustrate the specious nature of this claim. See, e.g., Del Martin
The HistoricalRoots of Donestic Violence, in, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 3
(Daniel J. Sonlin ed., 1987).
6.
See generally ANN JONES, NEkxT TIME SHE'LL BE DEAD (1994) for a

thorough discussion of battering cycles and societal responses to domestic violence.
7. Id. at 152.
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the law and by society at large. Indeed, there are only 1200 battered
women's shelters nationwide, many of which do not accept children. '
Police often are slow and poorly trained in responding to calls of
domestic disputes and violence.9 Although there has been increased
legislation at both the federal and state levels that seeks to assist
battered women, 10 domestic violence occurs in epidemic numbers, a
fact that continues to be ignored by judges in child custody cases.
Joint custody arrangements often contribute to, rather than ameliorate,
the history of violence.
II. JOINT CUSTODY

A. Background
Nationwide, the prevailing standard for custody is the "best
interest of the child,"" which emerged after a history of ch:]d custody
law that reflected gendered notions of family and the roles men and
women play within that unit. Until the late nineteenth century, the
norm for a father's custody was firmly in place as a result of his
prescribed role to support his family.12 Along with the financial
obligation to his wife and children and his legal recognition as the
head of the family came his right to custody. 3 As a result, custody
of children became associated as a property right to which only men
were entitled.14
The exclusive right of fathers to custody was challenged by early

8.
TRAINING

See AYUDA LEGAL SERvICES, HANDBOOK FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(on file with author).

9.
See, e.g., Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1990).
10. See, e.g., Protection From Abuse Act, 23 PA. CONS. STAr. ANN. §§
6101-6118 (West 1991); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796gg (1994).
11. Harvey R. Sorkow, Best Interests of the Child: By Whose Difinition? 18
PEPP. L. REv. 383, 386 (1991) (asserting that 37 states have adopted legislative
criteria to define the "best interest of the child" and the remaining stites rely on
precedent).
12. Martha Fineman, DominantDiscourse, ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmnaking, 101 HARv. L. REV. 727, 737 (1988).

13.

Sorkow, supra note 11, at 384.

14.

Fineman, supra note 12, at 737 (defining "paternal familius").
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feminists and by the newly established field of social work, whose
focus was on the children rather than on the parents' rights to the
children."5 The standard of the "best interest of the child" was a
natural product of the shift in focus from parents' rights to a childcentered norm premised on the welfare of the child and not on
economic interests.
The "best interest of the child" standard is both difficult to define
and to implement, consequently, a new set of presumptions emerged
which were designed to help courts apply the standard. First, the
"tender years" doctrine provided that children under seven should live
with the mother.16 Clearly, this reflected the traditional role of
women as nurturers in the home. Yet, as more and more women
entered the workforce, the tender years doctrine became objectionable
to those who felt confined by the gendered norm embodied in the
rule.17 In part to offset the discrimination of the tender years
doctrine and in part to respond to child development data, the second
principle invoked to implement the best interest standard was "samesex placement" for adolescents." e This system, too, was genderbased. Both the tender years and the same-sex placement doctrines
came under attack after the Orr v. Orrt decision in 1979.
Consequently, the custody standard shifted to "best interest,"
promoting individual assessments without blanket presumptions as to
which parent is a better caretaker for the child. This appearance of
gender-neutrality, however, fails to reflect the reality that people often
do lead gendered lives.
As the "best interest of the child" standard is unpredictable and
expensive, it has been criticized from all sides of the political and
social continuum. Most pointedly, many fathers insist they have been

15.

Id.

16. Id. at 738.
17. Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, ParentalPrcfercnce, and Child Custody 80
CALIF. L. REV. 615, 620 (1992).
18. Fineman, supra note 12, at 738-39.
19. 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that a state statute requiring only husbands,

but not wives to pay alimony upon divorce, was a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1997

HYBRID

[Vol. 4:55

discriminated against in custody decisions.2" They maintain that
despite a facially neutral standard, the law favors women because
women are considered to be the nurturers and men the moneymakers.
As a result, fathers' rights groups are now lobbying forcefully for a
joint custody presumption that would, they argue, level the child
custody playing field. 2 '
In 1957, North Carolina enacted the nation's first joint custody
legislation.22 The movement, though, began in earnest in 1979,
when California enacted a statute establishing a presumption that joint
custody was in the best interest of the child if the parents so agreed. 3
Since then, almost every state has considered legislation on joint
custody, and more than forty states have some statutory provisions
allowing the courts to award joint custody. 4
B. Joint Custody Defined
The term "joint custody" encompasses both legal and physical
custody. Joint legal custody means both parents retain equal legal
rights and responsibilities to the child at all times.2" This includes
the right to make decisions regarding the child's education, religion,
medical care, and discipline. Joint physical custody refers to the
sharing of physical living time and care of the child.26 In some
custody arrangements, the parents have both joint legal and joint
physical custody.27 While a legal custodian does not have to be a

20. The reality is that the majority of men who seek custody of their children
actually get it. The true bias in the court is against women, not men. See LENORE
J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 231-35 (1985).
21. Jed H. Abraham, Why Men Fightfor Their Kids: How Bias in the System
Puts Dads at a Disadvantage, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 48, 56 (1994).
22. JAY FOLBERG, JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 5 (1984). See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §50-13.2 (1996).
23. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994).
24. Abraham, supra note 21, at 50.
25. Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47
MD. L. REV. 497, 503 (1988).
26. Id.
27. Although it is possible to have joint legal custody and not joint physical
custody, the primary concern here is with situations in which both parents retain
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physical custodian in order to retain and exercise decisionmaking
rights, the physical custodian is responsible for day-to-day childrearing
duties.2S
C. Joint Custody Presumptions
There are three forms of the joint custody presumption: (1) a
presumption only when parents agree to a joint custody
arrangement;29 (2) the ability of the court to order joint custody in
any custody dispute regardless of whether the parents agree;71 or (3)
a blanket joint custody presumption that applies to all cases. 3 Under
a presumption statute, joint custody is surmised by law to be in the
best interest of the child, thus sole custody is ordered only when the
presumption is rebutted by evidence proving that joint custody is
2
detrimental to the child's best interest.
A batterer is not prevented from obtaining custody of his children
under any of the three joint custody models. 3 Joint custody, as the
norm, is assumed to be appropriate for all or most cases.
Consequently, sole custody is relegated to an exception only
considered after the court has decided against joint custody. The
degree to which joint custody is a rebuttable presumption depends both
on jurisdiction and judicial discretion.
Two important suppositions are implicit in a joint custody
presumption: first, that the parents will be able to cooperate in raising
their children and transporting them between homes, regardless of
whether the parents have freely chosen joint custody; and second, that
the harm caused to the children by interparental conflict will be
legal and physical custody of the children, for the goal of the fathers' rights
movement is for men to attain both.
28. Singer & Reynolds, supra note 25, at 503-04.
29. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2 (1995).
30. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 722.26a (West 1993).
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (West 195).
32. Joanne Schulman & Valerie Pitt, Second 7houghts on JointChild Custody:
Analysis of Legislation and its Inplicationsfor Woimcn and Children, 12 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 539, 551 (1982).
33. Naomi R. Calm, Civil Inages ofBattercd Women: The InipaetofDonestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1041, 1063 (1991).
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outweighed by the benefit of continuing a parent-child relationship
with both parents. At a minimum, joint custody requires that the
parents communicate and put aside personal differences and postdivorce hostility. In situations in which there is a custody battle so
fierce that a judge -- a complete stranger to the relationship -- must

decide with whom the child will reside, the underlying assumptions of
a joint custody arrangement are precarious at best. When the marriage
and separation have been riddled with domestic violence, the
assumptions fall apart completely.'
III. THE DANGER OF JOINT CUSTODY WHERE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HAS OCCURRED

Facially, joint custody arrangements are more equitable versions
of the "best interest of the child" standard insofar as they provide both
parents with access to and responsibility for the child. Yet, in
situations in which domestic violence has occurred, joint custody may
be a fatal arrangement for both the child and the battered woman.
Joint custody is predicated on "an extraordinary level of cooperation,
communication, and goodwill between the parents." 3
Ironically,
these qualities, among others, are precisely those missing from violent
relationships.
In cases of domestic violence, the victim can cooperate with the
batterer only under duress. 36 A battered woman generally wants her
abuser to stay away, 37 but joint custody precludes full separation
because the parents must transfer children back and forth and
participate jointly in decisionmaking. 3 This ongoing communication
34.

Lenore E.A. Walker & Glenace E. Edwall, Domestic Violence and

Determination of Visitation and Custody in Divorce, in DoMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
TRIAL 127, 140 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987) ("Joint custody... is impossible for

most relationships where there has been spouse or child abuse because mutual
decisioinaking cannot occur.").
35. Weitzman, supra note 20, at 247.
36. Caln, supra note 33, at 1067.
37. Most protection orders against abusers contain "stay-away" provisions as
the key to preventing further domestic violence.
38. See, e.g., Sturgill v. Wriston, 1994 WL 838133 (Del. Farn, Ct.). The
court inthis case ignores die history of brutality during the couple's relationship and

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol4/iss1/5

1997]

WHOSE RIGHTS MATTER MOST?

provides the batterer with greater opportunity to perpetuate his
abuse.39

People often question why battered women stay with their
abusers. In addition to the battering cycle that figures into a victim's
psychology,' many battered women are well aware that the
probability they will be killed by their batterers increases exponentially
if they attempt to leave the relationship.4" This fear of heightened
abuse after separation underscores the danger of joint custody
arrangements in violent relationships. Many batterers would rather
kill their wives or ex-wives than lose the control over them that comes
with separation and divorce.4" As Catherine Klein and Leslye Orloff
observe, "the propensity for continued violence remains after the
divorce or separation and frequently recurs during unsupervised
visitation or joint custody. Court orders which force victims to share
custody with their abusers place both victims and children in danger
....."3 Additionally, they note that "[dletermination of custody and
visitation of children are ways in which batterers frequently continue
their harassment and other abuse."44
The control and duress that accompany an ongoing relationship
with an abusive ex-husband are manifested in ways beyond the
increased potential for harm to the victim and the children. Most
the statutory provisions regarding custody in domestic violence cases. Id. at *9-10.
Disregarding the documented effects of the violence cycle, the judge considers joint
custody to be an appropriate lesson in cooperation. "Notwithstanding the domestic
violence perpetrated by father, I am satisfied that ajoint custody Order is appropriate
herein because I believe that the parties should be required to continue to discuss
issues involving their child, and that they should be forced to learn to do so in a

more amicable and conciliatory fashion than they have done in tie past. ' id. at *15.
39. Calm, supra note 33, at 1064.
40. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for discussion concerning the
cycle of violence.
41. LENORE E. VALKER, TERRIFY ING LovE: How BATrEREn WOMEN KiLL
AND How SOcTY RESPONDS 47 (19S9). Walker rebuts the claim that battering
stops the minute the victim leaves her abuser. "ITihe abuse often escalates at the
point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then." Id.
42. Id. at 65.
43. Klein & Orloff, supra note 2, at 952.
44. Id. at 953.
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prominently, because a battered woman is under duress in dealing with
her abuser, he may use his power to impact the custody and financial
arrangements; and, "[blecause of his control and her fear, the battered
spouse may agree to custody provisions which are not really desirable
for herself or the children. Alternatively, the battered spouse may
trade financial support or equitable distribution of assets for more
4
protective custody or visitation."
The unfair and unequal bargaining powers of the parties may
develop to the extent that the victim decides the protracted violence,
in addition to the stresses of divorce and custody, are not worthwhile
and may choose instead to return to a violent marriage. For these
reasons, judges and lawmakers should not be so quick to presume that
joint custody is always the best solution to the post-divorce custody
dilemma.46
Overall, courts and legislatures have been slow to recognize the
correlation between domestic violence and child custody
determinations. In 1990, however, Congress passed a Concurrent
Resolution that, for the purpose of determining child custody,
"credible evidence of physical abuse of one's spouse should create a
statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to be placed in
the custody of the abusive spouse."47 The Resolution specifically
states that "joint custody guarantees the batterer continued access and
control over the battered spouse's life through their children"4" and
that "joint custody forced upon hostile parents can create a dangerous
psychological environment for a child. 9

This Resolution, along with growing research that reveals that
children exposed to spousal abuse experience physical and emotional
harm, has encouraged many states to pass legislation incorporating
domestic violence into custody decisions." The effects of domestic
45. See id.
46. Id. at 950.
47. H.R. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 136 Cong. Rec. H8280-02, § 1 (1990)
(enacted) (listing harms to children from wife abuse).
48. Id. pmbl.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5)(Q)(a-1) (Supp. 1996) ("The
party found to have conmmitted an intrafamily offense has the burden of proving that
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violence on the child, however, are still perceived by many as being
indirect and thus innocuous and are rarely considered in custody
determinations. Studies, on the other hand, have shown that even if
children are not abused directly by a battering spouse, they are,
nonetheless, victims of the violence. This cuts two ways, as an expert
in In re the Marriageof Houtchens"t confirmed that "children are at
risk living with men who batter, both because of the likelihood that the
child will be battered and the likelihood that the child will rely on that
person as a role model."52 In other words, there are both current -3
and long-term' repercussions for a child who lives amid domestic
violence.
When making custody determinations in cases of violent
relationships, courts remain reluctant to consider the impact of abuse
on children and the effect of joint custody arrangements on battered
women. In reality, a woman's allegation of domestic violence in the
context of a custody dispute actually works against her efforts to
obtain custody. According to the "most generous parent" or "friendly
parent" provision of many custody statutes, the parent who is willing
to make the most concessions and who is most agreeable and flexible
is considered to be the better parent. " Thus, a battered woman who
is reluctant to cooperate with her abuser is disfavored in custody

visitation wiUll not endanger the child or significantly impair the child's emotional
development.").
51. 760 P.2d 71 (Mont. 1988) (holding that evidence of fathers physical abuse
of mother is related to the best interest of the child and should be considered in
custody determination).
52.

Id. at 72.

53. Calm, supra note 33, at 1057-58 (discussing the emotional impact on
children who are witnesses to domestic violence, as well as the "intergenerational"
patterns that result). See aLso Campbell v. Campbell, 584 So.2d 125, 127 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (the court duly notes the effects of ongoing contact between batterer
and battered woman on the child, stating "[slurely, fear that a custodial parent will
be assaulted or battered by a non-custodial parent constitutes an act of domestic
violence as to their child.").

54. Calm, supra note 33, at 1058 ("[C]hildren of violent fathers are more
likely to be violent themselves.").
55. Id. at 1064.
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decisions. 6 Until courts recognize the interrelationship between joint
custody and domestic violence, battered women will remain
unprotected from their abusers. For this reason, statutes that consider
spouse abuse as a factor in determining the best interest of the child
are preferable to joint custody presumption statutes. 57
Nonetheless, despite statutory efforts to take domestfc violence

into account when making custody determinations, "[nione of these
statutes prevents an abusive father, even one who has killed the
mother, from winning a custody battle .... "' Although the
statutes are a step in the right direction, for the most part domestic
violence remains only one of a long list of factors 9 that aid the court
in determining the best interest of the child, and therefore, the

statutory provisions remain inadequate. Notwithstanding the statutes
mandating the court to consider domestic violence when making
custody determinations, the ultimate decision of according the weight
of the violence to the custody determination resides at the judge's sole

56. Id. ("In states that have a statutory preference for joint custody or for
custody awards to the parent who is more willing to share the child, the battered
woman must accede to joint custody or risk losing custody. If she appears to the
court unlikely to want to share the child with the batterer, a court may give custody
to the father instead.")
57. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (West 1994) (creating a
rebuttable presumption against awarding joint or sole custody to the abusive spouse).
58. Calm, supra note 33, at 1063. See also Lutgen v. Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d
976 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), cert. denied, 537 N.E.2d 811 (11. 1989) (The Illinois
Appellate Court granted custody to the father once lie was released from prison for
choking to death the mother in front of the children. The court considered the six
statutory factors for determining the best interest of the child, one of which was "ie
physical violence... by the child's potential custodian, whether directed against the
child or directed against another person but witnessed by the child." 532 N.E.2d at
971. The court, using its discretion and opting to give this stipulation little weight,
concluded that "[o]ther than the tragic circumstances which resulted in the death of
[mother], [father] has an unblemished record." Id. at 970.). But see Bruner v.
Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 828 (N.D. 1995) (asserting that "[a] trial court cannot treat
the violence-presumption as simply another factor in custody .... The presumption
places an emphasis on domestic violence as the paramount factor in a custodial
placement when credible evidence of domestic violence appears. ").
59. The factors considered by the court in a custody award depend on the
jurisdiction.
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discretion.'
Admittedly, the best interest of the child standard is imperfect,
even when it is combined with legislation that takes domestic violence
into consideration. Nonetheless, if the child's interests are the true
focus, it is a far better standard than the joint custody presumption.
The blanket presumption, though, technically a variation on the best
interest of the child standard, essentially works to replace it. Joint
custody presumptions, express and implied, contradict and abrogate
the "best interest of the child" standard.
A possible solution offered by some feminist scholars is to
replace the "best interest" standard with a "primary caretaker"
presumption. Professor Naomi Cahn has noted that this "will
probably result in a custody award to the victim. Most victims of
domestic violence are women, and most primary caretakers are
women. "61 Critics of the primary caretaker standard insist, however,
that this would create too much of a pro-mother bias in custody
cases. 62 The primary caretaker standard, not unlike the joint custody
presumption, is a blanket presumption of reward. However, while the
former rightly reflects the parents' behavior prior to divorce, 3 the
latter is administered regardless of displayed parental participation and
parenting ability. The basis of the "best interest" standard, in
contrast, is a case-by-case determination, rather than a "presumption,"
of what is best for all children.
The notion of universal presumptions of what is best for the
family must be examined in conjunction with the recognition that its
advocates are, in effect, fighting for a recapitulation of the traditional,
patriarchal family structure, where fathers' "ownership" of their
children trumped the children's best interest." 4

60. Cahn, supra note 33, at 1065. Also note that these decisions are rarely
appealed, primarily because of the expense and because courts look favorably on
continuity for the child. Thus, courts remain reluctant to overturn prior decisions
absent neglect or a significant change in circumstances (i.e.. a modification order).
61. Id. at 1060 n.106.
62. For a refutation of this criticism, see Fineman, supra note 12, at 773.
63.
64.

Id. at 770.
Id. at 737.
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IV. THE FATHERS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT'S PUSH
FOR A JOINT CUSTODY PRESUMPTION

Fathers' rights groups are, essentially, well organized campaigns
for the rights of the father, absent any true consideration for the status
of the child or the mother. The movement65 has made the joint
custody presumption one of its central concerns and has been fairly
successful in its ventures. 66
The impetus for this movement has been the members' general
belief that fathers have been discriminated against by courts and by
judges in attempts to obtain custody of their children. 7 In other
words, men have been prevented from being responsible, attentive
fathers by a system patently biased toward mothers.6" As a result,
the fathers' rights movement has worked to deconstruct traditional
gender roles, aided by their battle cry that "[m]other is a verb, not a
noun." 69 Insisting that fathers are suitable for more than just child
support payments,70 they say, "we're more than walking wallets". 7 '

65. There are, in essence, two types of fathers' rights groups: one lobbies for
and litigates issues concerning child support and joint custody, and the other is more
concerned with getting fathers involved with their children as a bridge to returning
to a patriarchal system of "family values." Of course, there is overlap. In fairness,
there are different types of fathers' rights groups; some are more moderate than
others, but most have comparable political bents.
66. See generally Abraham, supra note 21.
67. PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL 425 (1986). It is also interesting
to note that the movement even has a site on the Internet that allows disgruntled
fathers to post the names of "discriminatory" judges, presumably to enable other
fathers to "forum shop."
68. See TERRY ARENDELL, FATHERS AND DIVORCE 48 (1995). One of the men
in Arendell's study equated his experience as a divorced father to that o f a pre-Civil
War slave. But see Calm, supra note 33, at 1060 n. 106 (rebutting the fathers' rights
movement's assertion of discrimination by noting that "when fathers act wely sought
physical custody, mothers obtained primary custody in only 7% of the cases"
(quoting MASSACHUSETrS GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMITIEE, GENDER BIAS STUDY
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

62 (1989)).

69. Chesler, supra note 67, at 425.
70. Abraham, supra note 21, at 49. Abraham notes that "fathers, however,
were not forgotten. They were awarded a consolation invented just for them. They
were ordered to pay child support to mothers." Id. One of the most disconcerting
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The rhetoric of the fathers' rights movement, however, is not
borne out statistically, as there is little empirical data suggesting that
a blanket joint custody presumption really is in the best interest of the
child.72 Several of the fathers' rights groups allege that the
involvement of both parents in a child's life reduces the child's
chances of being involved in drugs, crime, or teenage pregnancy by
tenfold.73 The joint custody presumption offers precisely this brand
of easy-out answers, but children deserve more individual
consideration.74

Children, the movement seems to suggest, are property that
should be distributed equally, just like any other marital asset. '
Indeed, the language of the movement is that of entitlement.76 This
in itself suggests that the focus of custody has been misplaced. The
move from traditional fathers' rights to children's rights has not, in
fact, occurred to the extent where courts are truly taking into account
the child's best interest. What is needed, therefore, is not a fathers'
rights movement, but a stronger children's rights lobby.'

aspects of the fathers' rights movement is its general dearth of supporting data and
its misuse of the social science data it does employ. See generally Martha Fineman
& Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody
Determinationsat Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107.

71.

Fineman & Opie, supra note 70, at 116 (citation omitted).

72. Singer & Reynolds, supra note 25, at 506-08. The authors assert that the
joint custody tests are poor indications of the standard's efficacy because most of the
sample groups are too small, not random, and the children's adjustment to the joint
custody arrangement is registered only through parental interviews. Id. Rather, the

authors suggest, the arguments for joint custody are based on the patriarchal family
model and an anti-mother, anti-feminist backlash. Id. at 511-12.
73. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Joseph McMillan, Assistant
Operations Director, National Congressfor Fathers and Children (Nov. 22, 1995).
74. Singer & Reynolds, supra note 25, at 515.
75. Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's
Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 11, 55 (1994).
76. Arendell, supra note 68, at 49. The author suggests that fathers are losing
the authority that they once had over their families, and they believe that dominance
is their right to regain.
77. Fitzgerald, supra note 75, at 60. Fitzgerald claims that, despite a lack of
empirical evidence in support of a joint custody presumption, mlclourts... choose
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Nevertheless, the current movement for fathers' rights in the form of
a statutory presumption for joint legal and physical custody endures.
Little attention has been devoted to the clash between joint
custody and domestic violence in the fathers' rights literature. The
general reaction by fathers' rights advocates to the domestic violence
concern is to question the veracity of the abuse allegation, 7 and in
so doing, they implicitly point to the "hysteria," unfitness, and lack of
co-operation of the mother. This is nothing less than anti-mother,
anti-woman, and anti-feminist backlash that is debunked repeatedly by
statistical data concerning the domestic violence epidemic. The
problem, of course, is that courts often echo the disgruntled fathers'
sentiment, disfavoring the parent who complicates matters by claiming
domestic violence.7 9

Although not in the fathers' rights literature, when pressed,
representatives of some groups have responded to the question of the
bridge between domestic violence and the joint custody presumption.
In their comments, these men have revealed a great deal about both
their biases and their goals. In sum, there are two keys to the fathers'
rights movement. First is the notion that single parenthood is
deviant' and that children with two parents are "ten times less likely
to get involved with drugs, violence, and pregnancy."81 In other
words, many of these organizations advocate "family values" to the
extent that we make a general societal return to the patriarchal family

between parental interests and ignore the child's." Id. See also MARTI-IA FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER 201 (1995) ("The rhetoric of fathers' rights and fathers'
responsibilities reflects the tendency to reduce family policy to mere discussions of
individual rights.").
78. Abraham, supra note 21, at 52 ("Counterpoint to the alienation of the
children [from the father because they are brainwashed by the mother] is tie false
domestic violence charge.").
79. For discussion on "friendly parenting" provision, see supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
80. Telephone Interview with Joseph McMillan, supra note 73 ("The people
who are most likely to physically abuse their children are mothers, not fathers.
Especially single parent moms where the stress of single parenting really gets to
them. ").
81. Id.
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structure.' Fathers' rights, not children's rights and not the rights
of battered women, are essential to the restoration of paterfamilias.s
Second, the representatives of the movement insist that "joint
custody does not commingle with the abuse issue."" 4 Many
advocates have asked, rhetorically, why it is domestic violence never
arises until divorce and custody fights begin. 5 While this question
shows a lack of understanding of the psyche of a battered woman, it
also illustrates an unwillingness to accept the domestic violence charge
as legitimate. David Levy, President of the Children's Rights
Council, asserts that there are often false allegations of domestic
violence in the context of divorce "in order to gain leverage in a
custody dispute . . . Right now, a mere allegation is enough to

interrupt a fathers' access to his children.""
In a similar fashion, Joseph McMillan, Assistant Operations
Director of the National Congress for Fathers and Children, said:
Men have parenting instincts in them, as well, believe it
or not. Think about it: if someone goes up to a mother
grizzly bear and tries to take her cub away, she'll harm
that person, right? When mothers try to take children
away from their fathers, the fathers may attack in a
similar manner. Many women say that men will never see
their kids again, so men strike back, sometimes
physically, and this is understandable.'
Conflicting messages are being sent. On the one hand, the fathers'

82.

See Abraham, supra note 21, at 51 (Denouncing statistical data generally,

Abraham writes, "Itlhe case for joint custody rests-and shall always rest-not on the
evanescent evidence of social science but on the enduring efficacy of family

values.").
83. Telephone Interview with David Blankenhorn, President, National
FatherhoodInitiative (Nov. 23, 1995) ("The best family is w.here there is a mommy
and a daddy.... Where that union absolutely cannot stand, joint custody is better
in ensuring fathers' rights.").
84. Telephone Interview with Joseph McMillan, supra note 73.
85. See Telephone Interviews conducted by author with advocates of the
fathers' rights movement (on file with author).
86. Telephone Interview with David Levy, President, Childrcn's Rights
Council (Dec. 15, 1995).
87. Telephone Interview with Joseph McMillan, supra note 73.
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rights advocates are arguing that a domestic violence allegation is a
ploy used by women to obtain full custody of their children at the
expense of the fathers' parenting right. On the other hand, they are
suggesting that men are justified in post-separation violence as means
to obtain their children. Again, fathers' rights above all.
V. CONCLUSION

Fathers' rights groups emerge as a sweeping movement replete
with bizarre contradictions. These are men who want to defy the
tradition of woman as nurturer and take an active role in their
children's lives. This facet, commendable on the surface, ends up as
a mere regression back to paterfamilias, and denounces the rights of
the children for which they fight so fervently. Rather than establishing
amicable ties with mothers, which truly would be in the child's best
interest, the various fathers' groups insist on devaluing the role of the
mother and degrading women in general. The bottom lire is that a
father's violence, even in the insular domestic sphere, should call into
question his parenting ability and the degree to which he is fit to care
for the child in the child's best interest.
It is not, however, entirely surprising that fathers' rights groups
doubt the veracity of the domestic violence charge. Indeed, in
repeatedly having awarded joint custody in abusive relationships,
various courts have demonstrated that they also do not take seriously
incidents of domestic violence. Perhaps legislative and court reform
for battered women is the appropriate place to start in the attempt to
mend this custody dilemma. Fathers' rights groups, however, should
not be so easily permitted to shield themselves behind claims of
discrimination and joint custody presumptions. In the name of fathers'
rights, men in the movement make light of domestic violence, battery
that does injury not only to women but to the children whose best
interests they purport to champion.
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